This is the second of several posts continuing the exchange between Bruce Waltke and me, posted earlier on this site, that first appeared in the Westminster Theological Journal. Posted here is Waltke’s follow-up to that exchange (PDF), which has already appeared in the latest issue of WTJ (and is also posted here with permission.)

Read Part One of my response here.

Below is the second part of my response to Waltke’s follow-up piece.

Nonsense and Logic

Waltke is concerned to maintain basic parameters of logic and to keep God from speaking “nonsense.” I think, though, that the entire point of our exchange has been to determine what in fact we have the right to label as “nonsense” and what a biblically oriented “logic” looks like. I may be missing something, but Waltke does not seem to consider this option.

Waltke repeatedly asserts that such things as human error in Scripture (which Hodge and Warfield themselves admitted to exist, by the way—see their booklet Inspiration, 27-28), or things commonly understood as mistakes, are unworthy of a book of ultimately divine origin. I do not wish to play word games, but I must continue to insist that just what these words mean, i.e., how they are to be defined, are the very things that need clearer definition precisely by bringing “biblical behavior” to the forefront of our debates rather than quick appeal to theological prolegomena.

To pick one extreme example, for some (not Waltke) it is “nonsense” to consider the differences of historical representation among the four Gospels or the synoptic accounts of Israel’s history in the Deuteronomistic History (Dtr) and the Chronicler. Diverse historical presentations in Scripture are “nonsense” because, since God is the author of Scripture, and Scripture is therefore “truth itself,” there really can be no synoptic “problem.”

I think Waltke and I are on the same footing when we respond, “No, the Bible itself will not allow for such an assessment of the nature of Scripture. The data do not support the theory.”

In principle, this is were we both are, but I would suggest that a real difference between Waltke and me is the extent to which we are willing to go in applying this same principle to other biblical phenomena. So, for example, I seem to be more willing to allow “Bible in its historical context” to determine what type of “logic” the Bible demonstrates and what constitutes “nonsense.” I am not only willing (begrudgingly) but fully prepared to engage the Second Temple hermeneutical context of the Chronicler in order to explain the differences between his account of Israel’s history and that of Dtr, as well as how the NT authors employ the OT.

All of this can be phrased as a question: What limits do we put on the contextual, historical, situatedness of the Bible for explaining biblical phenomenon, and therefore the nature of Scripture, and WHY, ON WHAT BASIS, do we place those limits? Or put another way, At what point do we, should we, say, “No, since this is the word of God, we can only go so far”? Or yet another way, At what point in applying an incarnational model are we ascribing error to God rather than merely observing the Bible’s “human nature”? These are ways of phrasing the disagreement between us, and further clarity would be achieved if we all dug a bit deeper to expose and critically evaluate the foundations of our thinking. At this stage, I do not think Waltke’s response moves us to greater clarity.

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