Below is the seventh of several posts continuing the exchange between Bruce Waltke and me, posted earlier on this site, that first appeared in the Westminster Theological Journal. Click here to read Waltke’s follow-up to that exchange (PDF), which has already appeared in the latest issue of WTJ (and is also posted here with permission.)

Read Part One of my response here.
Read Part Two of my response here.
Read Part Three of my response here
Read Part Four of my response here
Read Parts Five & Six of my response here

Here is part seven of my response to Waltke’s follow-up piece:

I Am too Sure of Myself, I Fail to Give Options Other than My Own, and I Give the “Appearance of Certainty” 

This is all probably true, but so is it of Waltke and pretty much anyone I read who is worth the time. We are all “sure of ourselves,” to a certain extent, convinced that what we have to say is worth listening to, which is why we write. Accusations such as this have little weight, since, as we have seen above, they are universally applicable.

Also, this type of accusation is really an indirect attempt to discredit the content of an argument and really has little to do with the manner of presentation. Had I argued for a model more to Waltke’s liking, and done so with as much vigor as he displays, would the same charge still be offered? Unlikely. To the contrary, I would be commended for taking a strong stand.

Of course, other options than what I offer are indeed possible. Other options are always available. If the history of biblical interpretation has shown us anything it is that anything is possible provided you have certain assumptions in place and you try hard enough to argue your point. The ultimate value of the different options, however, is to be determined by how persuasive they are in accounting for the data, not whether one fails to offer other options.

Later Revelation May not Contradict what “Earlier Texts Present as Truth”

The issue Waltke is addressing here concerns monolatry vs. monotheism in ancient Israel, i.e., whether at some point in time ancient Israelites believed that Yahweh was one god among others, but was the only one worthy of worship, or whether they only ever thought that Yahweh was the one and only divine being in existence.

Waltke seems to be saying that Israelites could not have moved from monolatry to monotheism, for, if this were the case, they would have moved from a “false” notion to a true one. Since God’s word can contain nothing false, this type of progressive revelation is a priori out of bounds.

Waltke does not seem to consider as theologically viable the notion that God can accommodate himself to ubiquitous ANE notions. Moreover, there are clear monolatrous statements in the Old Testament, statements, in other words, that can be shown to be monolatrous by rigorous exegesis (or not even all that rigorous). 

The issue of the advent of Israel’s understanding of monotheism is a perennial theological and historical problem (or better, it is a theological problem because it is a historical problem). It is not an issue that can be moved aside by appealing to God as the “inerrant Source” of Scripture, as Waltke does, unless it can be convincingly argued, contrary to exegesis, that the inerrant Source would not do such an unacceptable job at accommodation.

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